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Can the insurgents win in Iraq? maybe!

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Insurgencies Rarely Win, And Iraq Won"™t Be Any Different (Maybe)

 

By Donald Stoker

 

Posted January 2007

 

Vietnam taught many Americans the wrong lesson: that determined guerrilla fighters are invincible. But history shows that insurgents rarely win, and Iraq should be no different. Now that it finally has a winning strategy, the Bush administration is in a race against time to beat the insurgency before the public"™s patience finally wears out.

 

 

 

Not invincible: The that insurgents can"™t be beaten is a myth, because history shows otherwise.

The cold, hard truth about the Bush administration"™s strategy of "surging" additional U.S. forces into Iraq is that it could work. Insurgencies are rarely as strong or successful as the public has come to believe. Iraq"™s various insurgent groups have succeeded in creating a lot of chaos. But they"™re likely not strong enough to succeed in the long term. Sending more American troops into Iraq with the aim of pacifying Baghdad could provide a foundation for their ultimate defeat, but only if the United States does not repeat its previous mistakes.

Myths about invincible guerrillas and insurgents are a direct result of America"™s collective misunderstanding of its defeat in South Vietnam. This loss is generally credited to the brilliance and military virtues of the pajama-clad Vietcong. The Vietnamese may have been tough and persistent, but they were not brilliant. Rather, they were lucky-they faced an opponent with leaders unwilling to learn from their failures: the United States. When the Vietcong went toe-to-toe with U.S. forces in the 1968 Tet Offensive, they were decimated. When South Vietnam finally fell in 1975, it did so not to the Vietcong, but to regular units of the invading North Vietnamese Army. The Vietcong insurgency contributed greatly to the erosion of the American public"™s will to fight, but so did the way that President Lyndon Johnson and the American military waged the war. It was North Vietnam"™s will and American failure, not skillful use of an insurgency, that were the keys to Hanoi"™s victory.

Similar misunderstandings persist over the Soviet Union"™s defeat in Afghanistan, the other supposed example of guerrilla invincibility. But it was not the mujahidin"™s strength that forced the Soviets to leave; it was the Soviet Union"™s own economic and political weakness at home. In fact, the regime the Soviets established in Afghanistan was so formidable that it managed to survive for three years after the Red Army left.

Of course, history is not without genuine insurgent successes. Fidel Castro"™s victory in Cuba is probably the best known, and there was the IRA"™s partial triumph in 1922, as well as Algeria"™s defeat of the French between 1954 and 1962. But the list of failed insurgencies is longer: Malayan Communists, Greek Communists, Filipino Huks, Nicaraguan Contras, Communists in El Salvador, Che Guevara in Bolivia, the Boers in South Africa (twice), Savimbi in Angola, and Sindero Luminoso in Peru, to name just a few. If the current U.S. administration maintains its will, establishes security in Baghdad, and succeeds in building a functioning government and army, there is no reason that the Iraqi insurgency cannot be similarly destroyed, or at least reduced to the level of terrorist thugs.

Insurgencies generally fail if all they are able to do is fight an irregular war. Successful practitioners of the guerrilla art from Nathanael Greene in the American Revolution to Mao Zedong in the Chinese Civil War have insisted upon having a regular army for which their guerrilla forces served mainly as an adjunct. Insurgencies also have inherent weaknesses and disadvantages vis-Ã*-vis an established state. They lack governmental authority, established training areas, and secure supply lines. The danger is that insurgents can create these things, if given the time to do so. And, once they have them, they are well on their way to establishing themselves as a functioning and powerful alternative to the government. If they reach this point, they can very well succeed.

That"™s why the real question in Iraq is not whether the insurgency can be defeated-it can be. The real question is whether the United States might have already missed its chance to snuff it out. The United States has failed to provide internal security for the Iraqi populace. The result is a climate of fear and insecurity in areas of the country overrun by insurgents, particularly in Baghdad. This undermines confidence in the elected Iraqi government and makes it difficult for it to assert its authority over insurgent-dominated areas. Clearing out the insurgents and reestablishing security will take time and a lot of manpower. Sectarian violence adds a bloody wrinkle. The United States and the Iraqi government have to deal with Sunni and Shia insurgencies, as well as the added complication of al Qaeda guerrillas.

But the strategy of "surging" troops could offer a rare chance for success-if the Pentagon and the White House learn from their past mistakes. Previously, the U.S. military cleared areas such as Baghdad"™s notorious Haifa Street, but then failed to follow up with security. So the insurgents simply returned to create havoc. As for the White House, it has so far failed to convince the Iraqi government to remove elements that undermine its authority, such as the Mahdi Army. Bush"™s recent speech on Iraq included admissions of these failures, providing some hope that they might not be repeated.

That"™s welcome news, because one thing is certain: time is running out. Combating an insurgency typically requires 8 to 11 years. But the administration has done such a poor job of managing U.S. public opinion, to say nothing of the war itself, that it has exhausted many of its reservoirs of support. One tragedy of the Iraq war may be that the administration"™s new strategy came too late to avert a rare, decisive insurgent victory.

 

Donald Stoker is professor of strategy and policy for the U.S. Naval War College"™s Monterey Program. His opinions are his own. He is the author or editor of a number of works, including the forthcoming From Mercenaries to Privatization: The Evolution of Military Advising, 1815-2007 (London: Routledge, 2007).

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But history shows that insurgents rarely win.

 

You may want to review the history of Israel and the US to name a couple that you may have heard of.

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Stoker is delusional. People dont want foreigners in their country and they will do anything to expel them, no matter how long or bloody they have an inherent will to fight. Guerrillas always have time on their side , it's just a waiting game and a question of endurance. Bottom line unless you nukem they are usually there to stay, invading armies at some point have to go home.

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You may want to review the history of Israel and the US to name a couple that you may have heard of.

 

 

you may want to read the article

 

From the articleSuccessful practitioners of the guerrilla art from Nathanael Greene in the American Revolution to Mao Zedong in the Chinese Civil War have insisted upon having a regular army for which their guerrilla forces served mainly as an adjunct.

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Stoker is delusional. People dont want foreigners in their country and they will do anything to expel them, no matter how long or bloody they have an inherent will to fight. Guerrillas always have time on their side , it's just a waiting game and a question of endurance. Bottom line unless you nukem they are usually there to stay, invading armies at some point have to go home.

 

 

Japan and Germany

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Insurgents (Guerillas) have it easy.No ground to defend or occupy.Look up Viet Minh or Lawrence of Arabia.Or our own country's Swamp Fox (Marion) or Grey Ghost (Mosby) .Hit and Run.The more you read about it the more YOU think you could get away with it.

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Using our own revolution as an example, you'll find many instances where the outcome was very much in doubt, and others where whole regions (the south in particular) were in danger of being controlled by the loyalists who had their own militia who fought for what they thought was right.

 

An outside army can only seek to tip the scales in the favor of the side they favor in a civil war. In some ways, the revolution was our first experience with civil war. Unlike the British who turned enough of the colonial population towards the revolutioanries, we, in Iraq, must strive to reduce our profile and boost that of the indiginous forces.

 

If we can succeed in replacing the GI and Marine with the Iraqi soldier to the population, we have a shot at seeing the government prevail. If we are still seen as the preeminent force in Iraq, we will still be seen as occupiers and feed the insurgency, and the clock will run out on our efforts. We still won't lose the battle, but we could lose the war.

 

Jeff B.

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Insurgents win when their cause is just, their leaders brave, and when God has their back. And lose when their cause is cursed, their leaders evil, and God is not on their side. That has always been the case. I am not certain what sam843 has to do with any of those things.

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Insurgents win when their cause is just, their leaders brave, and when God has their back. And lose when their cause is cursed, their leaders evil, and God is not on their side. That has always been the case. I am not certain what sam843 has to do with any of those things.

 

 

As much as skatemaster does

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Stoker is delusional. People dont want foreigners in their country and they will do anything to expel them, no matter how long or bloody they have an inherent will to fight. Guerrillas always have time on their side , it's just a waiting game and a question of endurance. Bottom line unless you nukem they are usually there to stay, invading armies at some point have to go home.

 

 

There it is again - "nuke"! I TOLD you this would become more popular over the next few weeks!!!

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