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About J

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  • Birthday 07/08/1964

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  1. Facts don't change, they just get revealed.
  2. The most recent of course... With all the obstruction he's faced, trustworthy info was difficult to obtain. Things are changing now as they are being removed and access to data is gained. As time passes, the situation is becoming more clear. The IG report will be the last word for me. I*'m awaiting its release. I expect it to contain everything Trump has been stating and I also expect it to destroy the Democrats and the RINOs helping them. If I am wrong, I'll accept it. If I am right about all this, will you accept it or will you continue with the Never-Trump BS? I'm guessing the latter.
  3. And what does DJT say is his reasoning? I'll take DJT's statement over 2nd hand opinion every time.
  4. There's no telling with you anymore. It all looks like a joke. Between this crap, the tunnels, pizza and whatnot references........................
  5. I swear Garriga took over Mully's account. Mully used to be reasonable and factual. He had no need to make up fantasies and bend reality. Stormy planted? Really? Is that the best a seasoned lawyer such as yourself can come up with? You've been reduced to using childish tactics. Try backing your beliefs with actual facts instead of Mr Roger's Make Believe...
  6. Retiring to Club GITMO......
  7. Instead of the excuse "I can't post the link" try cutting and pasting the content right here so we can read it in the post. It is what everybody else does. . My 4 year old niece can do it, with a little effort maybe you can too. Just make sure you right click and paste without format as Tim directed. We don't want another excuse that the links put the C&P in mod q.
  8. Good! Start firing the deadwood, clean house and streamline this bloated bureaucracy. EXECUTIVE ORDERS Executive Order Promoting Accountability and Streamlining Removal Procedures Consistent with Merit System Principles BUDGET & SPENDING Issued on: May 25, 2018 By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 1104(a)(1), 3301, and 7301 of title 5, United States Code, and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and to ensure the effective functioning of the executive branch, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Purpose. Merit system principles call for holding Federal employees accountable for performance and conduct. They state that employees should maintain high standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the public interest, and that the Federal workforce should be used efficiently and effectively. They further state that employees should be retained based on the adequacy of their performance, inadequate performance should be corrected, and employees should be separated who cannot or will not improve their performance to meet required standards. Unfortunately, implementation of America’s civil service laws has fallen far short of these ideals. The Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey has consistently found that less than one-third of Federal employees believe that the Government deals with poor performers effectively. Failure to address unacceptable performance and misconduct undermines morale, burdens good performers with subpar colleagues, and inhibits the ability of executive agencies (as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code, but excluding the Government Accountability Office) (agencies) to accomplish their missions. This order advances the ability of supervisors in agencies to promote civil servant accountability consistent with merit system principles while simultaneously recognizing employees’ procedural rights and protections. Sec. 2. Principles for Accountability in the Federal Workforce. (a) Removing unacceptable performers should be a straightforward process that minimizes the burden on supervisors. Agencies should limit opportunity periods to demonstrate acceptable performance under section 4302(c)(6) of title 5, United States Code, to the amount of time that provides sufficient opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance. (b) Supervisors and deciding officials should not be required to use progressive discipline. The penalty for an instance of misconduct should be tailored to the facts and circumstances. (c) Each employee’s work performance and disciplinary history is unique, and disciplinary action should be calibrated to the specific facts and circumstances of each individual employee’s situation. Conduct that justifies discipline of one employee at one time does not necessarily justify similar discipline of a different employee at a different time — particularly where the employees are in different work units or chains of supervision — and agencies are not prohibited from removing an employee simply because they did not remove a different employee for comparable conduct. Nonetheless, employees should be treated equitably, so agencies should consider appropriate comparators as they evaluate potential disciplinary actions. (d) Suspension should not be a substitute for removal in circumstances in which removal would be appropriate. Agencies should not require suspension of an employee before proposing to remove that employee, except as may be appropriate under applicable facts. (e) When taking disciplinary action, agencies should have discretion to take into account an employee’s disciplinary record and past work record, including all past misconduct — not only similar past misconduct. Agencies should provide an employee with appropriate notice when taking a disciplinary action. (f) To the extent practicable, agencies should issue decisions on proposed removals taken under chapter 75 of title 5, United States Code, within 15 business days of the end of the employee reply period following a notice of proposed removal. (g) To the extent practicable, agencies should limit the written notice of adverse action to the 30 days prescribed in section 7513(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code. (h) The removal procedures set forth in chapter 75 of title 5, United States Code (Chapter 75 procedures), should be used in appropriate cases to address instances of unacceptable performance. (i) A probationary period should be used as the final step in the hiring process of a new employee. Supervisors should use that period to assess how well an employee can perform the duties of a job. A probationary period can be a highly effective tool to evaluate a candidate’s potential to be an asset to an agency before the candidate’s appointment becomes final. (j) Following issuance of regulations under section 7 of this order, agencies should prioritize performance over length of service when determining which employees will be retained following a reduction in force. Sec. 3. Standard for Negotiating Grievance Procedures. Whenever reasonable in view of the particular circumstances, agency heads shall endeavor to exclude from the application of any grievance procedures negotiated under section 7121 of title 5, United States Code, any dispute concerning decisions to remove any employee from Federal service for misconduct or unacceptable performance. Each agency shall commit the time and resources necessary to achieve this goal and to fulfill its obligation to bargain in good faith. If an agreement cannot be reached, the agency shall, to the extent permitted by law, promptly request the assistance of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and, as necessary, the Federal Service Impasses Panel in the resolution of the disagreement. Within 30 days after the adoption of any collective bargaining agreement that fails to achieve this goal, the agency head shall provide an explanation to the President, through the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM Director). Sec. 4. Managing the Federal Workforce. To promote good morale in the Federal workforce, employee accountability, and high performance, and to ensure the effective and efficient accomplishment of agency missions and the efficiency of the Federal service, to the extent consistent with law, no agency shall: (a) subject to grievance procedures or binding arbitration disputes concerning: (i) the assignment of ratings of record; or (ii) the award of any form of incentive pay, including cash awards; quality step increases; or recruitment, retention, or relocation payments; (b) make any agreement, including a collective bargaining agreement: (i) that limits the agency’s discretion to employ Chapter 75 procedures to address unacceptable performance of an employee; (ii) that requires the use of procedures under chapter 43 of title 5, United States Code (including any performance assistance period or similar informal period to demonstrate improved performance prior to the initiation of an opportunity period under section 4302(c)(6) of title 5, United States Code), before removing an employee for unacceptable performance; or (iii) that limits the agency’s discretion to remove an employee from Federal service without first engaging in progressive discipline; or (c) generally afford an employee more than a 30-day period to demonstrate acceptable performance under section 4302(c)(6) of title 5, United States Code, except when the agency determines in its sole and exclusive discretion that a longer period is necessary to provide sufficient time to evaluate an employee’s performance. Sec. 5. Ensuring Integrity of Personnel Files. Agencies shall not agree to erase, remove, alter, or withhold from another agency any information about a civilian employee’s performance or conduct in that employee’s official personnel records, including an employee’s Official Personnel Folder and Employee Performance File, as part of, or as a condition to, resolving a formal or informal complaint by the employee or settling an administrative challenge to an adverse personnel action. Sec. 6. Data Collection of Adverse Actions. (a) For fiscal year 2018, and for each fiscal year thereafter, each agency shall provide a report to the OPM Director containing the following information: (i) the number of civilian employees in a probationary period or otherwise employed for a specific term who were removed by the agency; (ii) the number of civilian employees reprimanded in writing by the agency; (iii) the number of civilian employees afforded an opportunity period by the agency under section 4302(c)(6) of title 5, United States Code, breaking out the number of such employees receiving an opportunity period longer than 30 days; (iv) the number of adverse personnel actions taken against civilian employees by the agency, broken down by type of adverse personnel action, including reduction in grade or pay (or equivalent), suspension, and removal; (v) the number of decisions on proposed removals by the agency taken under chapter 75 of title 5, United States Code, not issued within 15 business days of the end of the employee reply period; (vi) the number of adverse personnel actions by the agency for which employees received written notice in excess of the 30 days prescribed in section 7513(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code; (vii) the number and key terms of settlements reached by the agency with civilian employees in cases arising out of adverse personnel actions; and (viii) the resolutions of litigation about adverse personnel actions involving civilian employees reached by the agency. (b) Compilation and submission of the data required by subsection (a) of this section shall be conducted in accordance with all applicable laws, including those governing privacy and data security. (c) To enhance public accountability of agencies for their management of the Federal workforce, the OPM Director shall, consistent with applicable law, publish the information received under subsection (a) of this section, at the minimum level of aggregation necessary to protect personal privacy. The OPM Director may withhold particular information if publication would unduly risk disclosing information protected by law, including personally identifiable information. (d) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the OPM Director shall issue guidance regarding the implementation of this section, including with respect to any exemptions necessary for compliance with applicable law and the reporting format for submissions required by subsection (a) of this section. Sec. 7. Implementation. (a) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the OPM Director shall examine whether existing regulations effectuate the principles set forth in section 2 of this order and the requirements of sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this order. To the extent necessary or appropriate, the OPM Director shall, as soon as practicable, propose for notice and public comment appropriate regulations to effectuate the principles set forth in section 2 of this order and the requirements of sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this order. (b) The head of each agency shall take steps to conform internal agency discipline and unacceptable performance policies to the principles and requirements of this order. To the extent consistent with law, each agency head shall: (i) within 45 days of this order, revise its discipline and unacceptable performance policies to conform to the principles and requirements of this order, in areas where new final Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations are not required, and shall further revise such policies as necessary to conform to any new final OPM regulations, within 45 days of the issuance of such regulations; and (ii) renegotiate, as applicable, any collective bargaining agreement provisions that are inconsistent with any part of this order or any final OPM regulations promulgated pursuant to this order. Each agency shall give any contractually required notice of its intent to alter the terms of such agreement and reopen negotiations. Each agency shall, to the extent consistent with law, subsequently conform such terms to the requirements of this order, and to any final OPM regulations issued pursuant to this order, on the earliest practicable date permitted by law. (c) Within 15 months of the adoption of any final rules issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the OPM Director shall submit to the President a report, through the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, evaluating the effect of those rules, including their effect on the ability of Federal supervisors to hold employees accountable for their performance. (d) Within a reasonable amount of time following the adoption of any final rules issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the OPM Director and the Chief Human Capital Officers Council shall undertake a Government-wide initiative to educate Federal supervisors about holding employees accountable for unacceptable performance or misconduct under those rules. Sec. 8. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. (b) Agencies shall consult with employee labor representatives about the implementation of this order. Nothing in this order shall abrogate any collective bargaining agreement in effect on the date of this order. (c) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. (d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (e) If any provision of this order, including any of its applications, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and all of its other applications shall not be affected thereby. DONALD J. TRUMP THE WHITE HOUSE, May 25, 2018.
  9. That is fantasy Brian. Dishonest too. Comey was fired for a handful of reasons and he was advised to do so by Rosenstein....
  10. You'd also have to find a way to mitigate claims of selective prosecution. I'd start that argument with none other than Slick Willy in the Oral office playing with cigars inside interns...
  11. Let he who is without sin,cast the first stone. If you think you can find a jury of his peers to convict, go for it! If you think a jury can be gathered through the process of voir dire and not have a case of jury nullification as the outcome, you should get hard at work on this one
  12. The tide is most certainly going out on the Left. Their narratives are being left high and dry in the process... The Real Constitutional Crisis The FBI and Justice Department continue evading congressional oversight. Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein speaks at the Bloomberg Law Leadership Forum, New York City, May 23. PHOTO: VICTOR J. BLUE/BLOOMBERG NEWS By Kimberley A. Strassel May 24, 2018 6:39 p.m. ET Democrats and their media allies are again shouting “constitutional crisis,” this time claiming President Trump has waded too far into the Russia investigation. The howls are a diversion from the actual crisis: the Justice Department’s unprecedented contempt for duly elected representatives, and the lasting harm it is doing to law enforcement and to the department’s relationship with Congress. The conceit of those claiming Mr. Trump has crossed some line in ordering the Justice Department to comply with oversight is that “investigators” are beyond question. We are meant to take them at their word that they did everything appropriately. Never mind that the revelations of warrants and spies and dirty dossiers and biased text messages already show otherwise. We are told that Mr. Trump cannot be allowed to have any say over the Justice Department’s actions, since this might make him privy to sensitive details about an investigation into himself. We are also told that Congress—a separate branch of government, a primary duty of which is oversight—cannot be allowed to access Justice Department material. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Devin Nunes can’t be trusted to view classified information—something every intelligence chairman has done—since he might blow a source or method, or tip off the president. That’s a political judgment, but it holds no authority. The Constitution set up Congress to act as a check on the executive branch—and it’s got more than enough cause to do some checking here. Yet the Justice Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation have spent a year disrespecting Congress—flouting subpoenas, ignoring requests, hiding witnesses, blacking out information, and leaking accusations. Senate Judiciary Chairman Chuck Grassley has not been allowed to question a single current or former Justice or FBI official involved in this affair. Not one. He’s also more than a year into his demand for the transcript of former national security adviser Mike Flynn’s infamous call with the Russian ambassador, as well as reports from the FBI agents who interviewed Mr. Flynn. And still nothing. Ron Johnson, chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, is being stonewalled on at least three inquiries. The House Judiciary and Oversight committee chairmen required a full-blown summit in April with Justice Department officials to get movement on their own subpoena. The FBI continues to block a fuller release of the House Intelligence Committee’s Russia report. Not that the documents that Justice sends over are of much use. Mr. Grassley this week excoriated the department for its routine practice of redacting key information, and for similarly refusing to provide a “privilege log” that details the legal basis for withholding information. His team recently discovered that one of the items Justice had scrubbed from the Peter Strzok-Lisa Page texts was the duo’s concern that former Deputy FBI Director Andrew McCabe had a $70,000 conference table. (Was it lacquered with unicorn tears?) A separate text refers to an investigation that the White House is “running,” but conveniently blacks out which one. The FBI won’t answer Mr. Johnson’s questions about who is doing the redacting. This intransigence is creating an unprecedented toxicity between law enforcement and Congress, undermining what has long been a cooperative and vital relationship. It is also pushing lawmakers ever closer to holding Justice Department officials in contempt or impeaching them. Congress hasn’t impeached a member of the executive branch (presidents excepted) since the 19th century. Let’s agree such a step would amount to a real crisis. And the pressure to use these tools to get disclosure is growing, as congressional Republicans worry about losing their oversight authority in the midterms, and suspect the Justice Department is stringing them along for that very reason. Which is why Mr. Trump was right to order that Justice comply with Mr. Nunes’s demands for documents about the alleged FBI spy Stefan Halper and other information related to the catalyst of this investigation. As president, he has a duty to protect the reputation and integrity of the Justice Department—even from its own leaders. Forcing officials to comply with legitimate congressional oversight is far better than sitting back to watch those same officials singe the institution and its relationship with Congress in a flame of impeachment resolutions. Mr. Trump has an even quicker way to bring the hostility to an end. He can—and should—declassify everything possible, letting Congress and the public see the truth. That would put an end to the daily spin and conspiracy theories. It would puncture Democratic arguments that the administration is seeking to gain this information only for itself, to “undermine” an investigation. And it would end the Justice Department’s campaign of secrecy, which has done such harm to its reputation with the public and with Congress. Appeared in the May 25, 2018, print edition.